Rethinking intelligence in an information-saturated world
For much of modern history, intelligence was defined by secrecy. Power came from controlling information, restricting access, and shaping what others could see and know. That world no longer exists.
Wesley K. Wark captured this shift more than two decades ago when he observed that “intelligence producers need to recognize that they are in the information business rather than the secrecy business and that they no longer have a monopoly on the production of or access to key knowledge” (2003). In hindsight, Wark’s insight reads less like a warning and more like a description of the operating environment intelligence professionals now inhabit daily.
The internet introduced an information-rich environment defined by hyperconnectivity, speed, and scale. At its core, this transformation altered the function of intelligence work itself, shifting the emphasis from guarding secrets to identifying, interpreting, and contextualizing useful information. While this transition did not occur overnight, it accelerated rapidly alongside the global expansion of the internet, which connected billions of people and platforms across geographic and political boundaries. Today, intelligence-relevant information is collected from countless online sources including social media, forums, blogs, emails, and open databases. Geographic proximity is no longer a prerequisite for access to critical information, because much of it already exists in the open.
When More Information Does Not Mean Better Intelligence
Having access to such vast amounts of information can offer clear advantages to intelligence operations. Rather than relying exclusively on high-risk human collection, agencies can gather and analyze information from online sources at scale. In theory, this shift should make intelligence work safer, faster, and more efficient. However, the Information Age introduces a new set of challenges that complicate this promise.
The sheer volume of data available online creates a significant burden for intelligence professionals, who must determine what information is relevant, credible, and actionable. Large data sets require sophisticated tools, trained analysts, and substantial time to process effectively. Access alone does not equate to insight. Additional complications arise from cross-agency information-sharing barriers, regulatory constraints, and policies governing intelligence collection (Townsend et al. 2013). While the digital transformation rapidly reshaped both public and private sectors, many intelligence organizations continue to struggle to keep pace with the operational demands of an information-saturated environment. The existence of valuable information online does not guarantee the institutional capacity to monitor, analyze, and act on it.
Losing the Monopoly on Information
Prior to the internet, intelligence agencies operated in a more controlled information ecosystem. Their responsibilities included safeguarding classified material and deliberately manufacturing and disseminating information to influence foreign populations or governments. Wark described this environment as one in which intelligence agencies held a “monopoly” over key knowledge (2003). Control over information flow was not absolute, but it was significantly more centralized than it is today.
Information traveled through hierarchical channels such as newspapers, radio, and television, each governed by editorial oversight and organizational leadership. The predecessor to the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), leveraged these traditional media channels to shape public sentiment, influence adversaries, and sow confusion through competing narratives (Lalaki 2013). These efforts were possible in part because the information environment itself was structured, slower-moving, and easier to manage.
That advantage has eroded. The internet democratized not only access to information, but also the ability to create, distribute, and amplify it. Information now moves faster than institutional decision-making cycles, and narratives often solidify before intelligence assessments can be completed. The systematic controls that once defined intelligence operations have been dismantled by platforms that prioritize speed, engagement, and scale over verification and intent.
Adapting Intelligence for the Digital Age
To gain and maintain information advantage, intelligence agencies must adapt to an operating environment fundamentally different from that of the OSS era. This requires developing capabilities to analyze large data sets, harness artificial intelligence, and leverage digital tools such as satellite imagery, GPS, and social media platforms for collection and analysis (Peperkamp 2024).
Adaptation is not solely a technical challenge. It also requires a shift in institutional posture. Intelligence organizations can no longer rely on exclusively proactive models of collection and dissemination. Instead, they must adopt integrated approaches that combine proactive analysis with heightened reactivity to rapidly evolving information flows. Monitoring multiple platforms simultaneously, deploying automated analytic tools, and responding quickly to disinformation campaigns are now core intelligence functions rather than auxiliary tasks.
Modern intelligence agencies are no longer tasked simply with protecting secrets. They must operate continuously within a contested, multi-domain information environment where relevance, speed, and credibility matter as much as classification levels.
Conclusion: Intelligence After Secrecy
Wark’s observation that intelligence is no longer a secrecy business captures a defining reality of modern intelligence work. The loss of monopoly over information does not diminish the importance of intelligence agencies, but it fundamentally changes how value is created. Advantage now comes from sensemaking, synthesis, and timely judgment rather than exclusive access.
Failure to adapt carries real risk. When intelligence organizations cannot process information as quickly as adversaries, narratives harden, public trust erodes, and strategic surprise becomes more likely. Information overload, cognitive strain on analysts, and overreliance on automated tools without human judgment further compound these challenges.
The future of intelligence depends on embracing its role in an open, saturated information environment rather than resisting it. Agencies that invest in analytic capacity, human expertise, and adaptive tradecraft will be better positioned to compete in this space. Intelligence is no longer defined by what can be hidden. It is defined by how effectively meaning can be extracted, communicated, and acted upon in a world where information is everywhere.
References:
Lalaki, Despina. “Soldiers of Science—Agents of Culture: American Archaeologists in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).” Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens 82, no. 1 (2013): 179–202. https://doi.org/10.2972/hesperia.82.1.0179
Peperkamp, Lonneke. “Technology and the Civilianization of Warfare.” Ethics & International Affairs 38, no. 1 (2024): 64–74. http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?qurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.proquest.com%2Fscholarly-journals%2Ftechnology-civilianization-warfare%2Fdocview%2F3111573685%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D8289
Townsend, Troy, Melissa Ludwick, Jay McAllister, Andrew O. Mellinger, and Kate Ambrose Sereno. Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Project: Summary of Key Findings. Pittsburgh, PA: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, January 2013. https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=40201
Wark, Wesley K. “Introduction: ‘Learning to Live with Intelligence.’” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003): 1–14. https://doi-org.ezproxy2.apus.edu/10.1080/02684520310001688853